The Theory of Contractual Imbalance in the Context of Contemporary Economic Crises: A Comparative Analytical Study of Algerian and French Civil Law

Abstract

This study aims to analyse the theory of contractual imbalance as a modern legal mechanism for achieving contractual justice in the context of contemporary economic crises, which have caused significant disruption to contractual relationships, particularly long-term ones. Rapid economic changes such as inflation, price volatility and global crises have shown that traditional civil law rules based on the principle of contractual obligation and the will of the parties are inadequate for dealing with the excessive burdens borne by one party due to unforeseen circumstances. 

The study examines the conceptual and legal framework of the theory of contractual imbalance, setting it apart from related theories such as the general theory of unforeseen circumstances, economic duress and force majeure. It also highlights instances of contractual imbalance in Algerian civil law, particularly in relation to the abuse of rights and breach of the principle of good faith. The study also sheds light on legislative developments in French civil law, particularly the 2016 amendment establishing the principle of renegotiation and granting judges broader authority to modify or terminate contracts in the event of imbalances. 

Employing a comparative analytical approach, the study concludes that, while the theory of contractual imbalance is not explicitly enshrined in Algerian civil law, it includes implicit mechanisms for addressing it. However, these mechanisms are less effective than those in France, which highlights the need for legislative reform that balances transaction stability and contractual justice.